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Abstract 
Compared with the number of nuclear power plants that will be 
decommissioned over the next few years accelerators are only a "small" source 
of radioactivity although at CERN the total amount of mostly metallic material 
activated in the operation of the accelerators is estimated to be of the order of 
15 Mtons. Various existing approaches to classify and administer radioactive 
material will be presented with all of them clearly earmarked by the 
requirements of the nuclear cycle. There are however important differences 
between activation in reactors and accelerators that will be worked out. It will 
be shown that an attitude based on reuse or recycling of activated accelerator 
material should be preferred to the elimination as radioactive waste. 
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Radioactive material in big quantities is always 
associated with nuclear power and known to the public as 
radioactive waste with all the negative image that it has 
developed over the years. National working groups as well 
as international committees generally consider the nuclear 
cycle correctly as the major source of man made 
radioactivity. 
High-energy accelerators are usually big machines 
capable of accelerating electrons or protons beyond the 
energy of some tens of Me V. When such beams interact 
with material nuclear processes will lead to the formation of 
radionuclides inducing radioactivity in the accelerator 
structure and the surrounding shielding. 
This paper will concentrate on the particular aspects of 
radioactive material that is released from accelerators 
during maintenance or repair when no longer be needed. 
Whilst this concerns parts like activated vacuum chambers 
or other beam elements during the exploitation phase of an 
accelerator the amount of radioactive material can be 
considerable in cases where a whole accelerator complex is 
dismantled. 
CHARACTERIZATION OF 
RADIOACTIVITY IN ACCELERATORS 
A large experience in the activation processes around 
high-energy accelerators acquired over the last forty years 
has found its way into many publications. There are three 
main ways of activation that lead to a multitude of 
radionuclides in materials hit by beams of electrons or 
protons. 
The classical path is via neutron induced nuclear 
reactions mostly in the form of a (n,y)-process where the 
probability of formation of a particular radionuclide is as 
usual determined by the cross-section. 
There are also inverse reactions (y,n) with usually small 
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cross-sections hence only little importance in proton but 
naturally more important in electron accelerators. 
The third and by far the most important pathway of 
inducing radioactivity in proton accelerators is the direct 
hadronic interaction of a high-energy particle with the 
nucleus of a target material. In these spallation reactions the 
products have always lower, in many cases much lower, 
atomic numbers than their tar~et nucleus. Typical radio-
active spallation products are H and 7Be but also stable 
helium nuclei are formed in these reactions. 
Naturally all induced radioactivity decays according to 
the half-lives of the radionuclides created. As far as radio-
active material is concerned that is subject to reuse, 
recycling or waste disposal, only relatively long-lived 
radionuclides are important. It is generally accepted that 
before any conditioning of radioactive material takes place 
a sufficiently long cooling time has elapsed such that at 
least the spallation product 7Be with its half-life of 53 days 
has decayed. 
In table 1 the most common induced radionuclides with 
half-lives longer than 60 days as identified for typical 
materials used in the construction of accelerators are listed: 
Metals are important construction materials for machines 
with iron magnets and copper or aluminum coils. Plastic 
material insulates power and signal cables. Cooling of 
construction elements with demineralized water is assured 
through tubing made from stainless steel. Iron, earth and 
concrete barriers provide biological shielding. Lead is 
seldom used around proton machines whilst it is an 
important shielding material against photons and high-
energy electrons. Barytes concrete is rarely encountered as 
it is expensive, mechanically less stable than normal 
concrete, and giving rise to the ill reputed radionuclides of 
cesium. Other materials like silver are found only in small 
quantities mostly as impurity in lead. 
The table illustrates the fact that with heavier target 
material the number of possible radionuclides increases and 
that in spallation reactions very low atomic number nuclei 
like tritium are formed with all heavier elements. 
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TABLE 1: Commonly identified long lived radionuclides (Half-life> 60 days) in materials activated 
around high-energy accelerators, their main reaction path(s) and radiation hazard. 
Target Radionuclide Half-life 
material 
Plastics 3H 12.2y 
36(] 3·105 y 




Steel, stainless As above plus 
steel 46Sc 84d 
44Ti 48y 







Copper As above plus 
65Zn 245d 




Earth As above plus 
1s2Eu 12.7y 
154£u 16 y 
Concrete As above plus 
(barytes) 133Ba 10.Sy 
1J4Cs 2.06y 
137Cs 30y 
The inventory of radionuclides in accelerators is quite 
distinct from those identified in reactors. There are no 
fission products and alpha emitters but high-energy proton 
and electron accelerators induce rather beta/gamma 
radiation emitting isotopes instead, characterized by a 
predominance of positron emitters. As far as their 
radiological risk is concerned most of the radionuclides 
present only an external radiation hazard. A possible ex-
ternal exposure is determined by the dose rates at a certain 
distance from an activated material and is, in the case of 
voluminous items, a function of the distribution of the 
activity inside the piece and the self-shielding properties of 
the material. Internal exposure is the result of ingestion or 
inhalation of radioactive material. In view of the fact that 
solid materials around high-energy accelerators are 
activated in the bulk (minor) contamination risks exist only 
when surfaces are dusty or become corroded in case 
radioactive material is stored inappropriately. 
With respect to the half-lives of the radionuclides there 
are a few very long lived isotopes that. are difficult to 
detect. Due to short activation periods (several years) 
compared with their long half-lives they are generally 
present only in small concentrations. One can estimate that 
after a decay time of about one year more than 80% of the 
activated solid materials (mostly metals) in a proton and 
more than 95 % of those in an electron accelerator have 
4 
Main reaction path and radiation hazard 
Spallation; internal 
35Cl(n,y); internal 
I4N(n,p); 17Q(n,a); Spallation; internal 
Spallation; 23Na(y,n); external 
27 Al(y,n); external 
Spallation; external 
Spallation; external 
54fe(n,p); SSMn(y,n); external 
54fe(n,y); internal 
56fe(p,n); external 
56fe(p,y); SSNi(y,p); external 
59Co(y,n); 55Mn(a,n); external 
59Co(n,y); 60Ni(n,p); 63Cu(n,a); external 
62Ni (n,y); external 
65Cu(p,n); 64Zn(n,Y); external 






lJJCs(n,y); 134Ba(n,p); external, internal 
137Ba(n,p );138Ba(y,p ); external, internal 
specific activities of less than 100 Bq/g. In view of the low 
radiological hazard of such material and given the financial 
value of metallic scrap, recycling should be considered 
rather than disposal as radioactive waste. The cost of 
radioactive disposal has dramatically increased over the last 
years and bulky items like magnet yokes from accelerators 
pose a particular problem of conditioning before disposal 
can even be envisaged. 
The possibility of reuse of radioactive material in a 
radiation environment is often stressed in the literature but 
is rather limited in practice. Hence, the cost of casting 
shielding blocks using radioactive iron is prohibitive and is 
much more expensive than buying new blocks made from 
virgin material. 
EXEMPTION VALUES AND CLEARANCE 
LEVELS 
It is a general concept in radiation protection that the use 
of small quantities of radioactivity is exempted from any 
regulatory control and subsequently needs no authorization. 
In many countries this however does not mean that 
exempted radioactivity can be disposed of, recycled or 
reused without any restriction. 
Therefore the concept of exemption values (EV) has 
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been extended introducing clearance levels (CL). These 
CLs being either unconditional or conditional would then 
permit the release of material as inactive either without any 
condition or under some restriction. However, at present 
such values are neither officially proposed in the EU 
Directive (1) nor in the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) Basic Safety Standards (2) although it 
would be necessary to provide unconditional clearance 
levels (UCLs) to cope with an ever increasing amount of 
slightly radioactive solid and frequently metallic material 
for which a release free from any regulatory control would 
be reasonable. 
Nevertheless, after having scrutinized a number of 
reports on the issue the IAEA have published UCLs in a 
Technical Document (3). There is a tendency to follow the 
most conservative exposure path when estimating the 
resulting doses in the handling such material or for the 
general public. Furthermore, considering the uncertainties 
of the models used IAEA's system of UCLs is based on 
five categories of radionuclides only. Clearance levels of 
specific activity range from 0.1 to 1.0, 1 to 10, 10 to 100, 
100 to 1000 and 1000 to 10000 Bq/g with representative 
values of 0.3, 3, 30, 300, and 3000 Bq/g. When proposing 
the UCLs the IAEA adopted three seemingly universally 
accepted criteria: 
- individual doses to the average member of a critical 
group from likely exposure scenarios should be constraint 
to JO µSvla and for unlikely scenarios to 100 µSvla. 
- the collective dose per year of practice involving 
cleared material should be less than about 1 man·Sv 
- clearance levels should not be greater than exemption 
values in order to avoid the legal problem that a cleared 
material, because it is no longer exempted, falls again 
under regulatory control. 
Table 2 places IAEA's EVs that are identical to those in 
the European Directive in a synopsis with a collection of 
unconditional and conditional clearance levels from various 
sources. The EVs in column 2 are up to two orders of 
magnitude higher than the UCLs in column 3 published in 
IAEA's Technical Document (3). 
Columns 4 and 5 contain CLs that are only valid under 
specific boundary conditions. Conditional clearance of 
radioactivity has been practiced since long, is further 
developed in many countries like in CERN's host counties 
France and Switzerland, and will be discussed below. 
The clearance condition for a mixture of radionuclides 
in a given material is calculated with the help of the 
following formula: 
'Li A/CL...:;, 1 
where Ai is the specific activity of radionuclide i and 
Cy the corresponding unconditional or conditional 
clearance level. Here it is generally accepted not to 
consider radionuclides that contribute less than 10 % to the 
annual effective dose of 10 µSv. 
Clearing of material means that the material is released 
from any future regulatory control and subsequently needs 
an authorization by the competent authorities. It also means 
that for any decommissioning of an accelerator the practical 
conditions must be fixed under which materials can be 
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cleared and that necessary checks in the dismantling phase 
are performed by an independent controlling body. The ad-
ministrative and technical procedures for clearance gene-
rally are lengthy in time but in practice CLs for materials 
with half-lives shorter than 60 days are not required. In fact, 
due to the initial fast decay of radioactivity from the 
accelerator environment the IAEA EVs could be used for 
all short-lived radionuclides without significantly increa-
sing the radiological hazard to people getting in contact 
with the material. 
Table 2. Comparison of exemption values and clearance 
levels in Bq/ g for commonly identified long-lived radio-
nuclides (Half-live > 60 days) in activated materials 
around high-energy accelerators. For an explanation of 
the columns see text. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Nuclide EV (1,2) UCL (3) LE (4) CLF (5) 
3H 106 3·103 3·102 1()4 
14C 1()4 3·102 20 103 
22Na 10 0.3 3 1 
26Al ? ? 2 ? 
36Cl 1()4 3·102 10 103 
44Ti ? ? 1 ? 
46Sc 10 ? 5 1 
54Mn 10 7 10 1 
55fe 1()4 3·102 70 103 
56Co 10 ? 3 1 
S7Co 102 30 30 10 
SSCo 10 3 10 1 
liOCo 10 0.3 1 1 
63Ni 105 3·103 50 1()4 
65Zn 10 ? 3 1 
108mAg 10 ? 5 1 
110mAg 10 0.3 3 1 
133Ba ? ? 10 ? 
134Cs 10 0.3 0.5 1 
137Cs 10 0.3 0.7 1 
1s2Eu 10 0.3 5 1 
154Eu 10 ? 3 1 
204Tl 1()4 ? 10 103 
For the practical clearing of material a most interesting 
approach is used in Switzerland. The "exemption limits" 
LE in column 4 of table 2 are actually clearance levels for 
disposal, recycling and reuse of radioactive material under 
the condition that the dose rate at 10 cm from the surface of 
the object is anywhere smaller than 0.1 µSv/h. This places 
the emphasis on the external radiation hazard of solid radio-
active materials and means that due to this constraint in the 
case of big objects LE values can be rarely directly applied 
in practice. In the case of a steel block of 1 m3 the 
corrected LE value drops to only 0.5 Bq/g whilst for 60Co 
the value is only 0.2 Bq/g for an object of similar dimen-
sions. Hence, these corrected LE values are rather close to 
the most conservative CLs in table 2. In addition, to be on 
the safe side the maximum value of specific activity in an 
extended object like a magnet should be lower than the LE 
value, thus guarantying that the overall specific activity of 
the object is always lower than LE. 
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In France there are no UCLs either. However, for the de-
commissioning of nuclear installations the CEA has pro-
posed a procedure that could be assimilated to conditional 
clearing (5). However, the French approach requires that 
the "non radioactivity" of a material is first established by 
reasoning. This means for an accelerator to collect all past 
information on operational scenarios like beam energies, 
intensities and possible loss pattern in the machine or beam 
lines and to perform appropriate calculations estimating the 
activity of radionuclides that could have been created. 
Their calculated concentrations are corrected for their half-
lives. If in certain parts of an accelerator complex to be 
dismantled these results turn out to be below the CLFs in 
column 5 of table 2 the material following an official 
authorization can be cleared as inactive. The CLFs are 
actually one tenth of the EVs European Directive except for 
tritium where the value is one hundredth of the EV (5). 
Measurements of specific activity in the course of the 
dismantling must always show lower values than those 
obtained by the generally pessimistic calculations. 
MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL 
Management of radioactive material from a high-energy 
accelerator environment is a continuous action. Obsolete 
activated vacuum chambers or radioactive cables are deli-
vered for radioactive storage at any time whilst e. g. bigger 
parts like whole activated magnets come in during longer 
shut-down periods. Usually the material requires and is left 
in pre-storage for some radioactive cooling prior to any 
further handling. However, before conditioning takes place 
the first step should be a classification where the following 
scheme of Categories adopted at CERN is rather 
convenient and practical. 
In Category I falls material where in a relatively short 
time (up to a year) the specific radioactivity will have 
dropped below agreed clearance levels. Category II com-
prises all material where the analysis of the radionuclides 
involved shows that the specific activity will drop below 
clearance levels after 30 years of cooling. For this Category 
an approximate upper limit of specific activity for material 
that underwent an initial radioactive cooling time of at least 
one year is 100 Bq/g. Finally, in Category III all material of 
higher activity is placed subject to release as radioactive 
waste. 
Following conditioning which in most cases means 
material separation, cutting and volume reduction, radio-
active material of Category II must be kept for longer 
periods before its release as non-active. Whole magnets or 
other complex accelerator elements are rather dismounted 
to separate materials but also in view of taking off any 
Category III items of higher activity. Big pieces are 
sometimes also cut to ease future handling. Aluminium 
vacuum chambers are pressed to cubes. The insulation is 
either cut off cables or becomes separated from the metal 
when cables are shredded and generally falls into 
Category I. Eventually most of the material is collected in 
storage containers according to material type and activity 
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level. In many cases dose rate measurements at 10 cm for a 
given storage geometry combined with measurements of 
specific activity give rather reliable information on the total 
activity stored in a container. 
Category II materials have been analyzed at CERN's 
high-energy accelerators following several years of 
irradiation and 5 to 10 years of radioactive cooling. The 
percentage distribution of the long-lived radionuclides 
naturally depends on the actual material composition 
(Stainless steel and concrete could vary quite a bit), the 
irradiation type (direct proton or neutron radiation), and 
exposure (intensity and timely pattern). It is quite obvious 
that in practice the important radionuclides for material 
activated in an accelerator environment are 6()Co in the case 
of iron, copper and stainless steel (80 to 98%). 22Na is 
determined in the case of aluminum ( 100%) and concrete 
(38 to 95%) where 152Eu could be the dominant radio-
nuclide in concrete or earth (2 to 52%) after 22Na has 
decayed. Following an additional cooling time of 20 years 
the activity in all of the materials analyzed will have 
decayed below a total specific activity of I Bq/g. 
Eventually, following conditioning, Category III material 
could in principle be shipped in containers that fulfil the 
local requirements for long term storage to radioactive 
waste depositaries. At present it seems, however, that, 
whilst appropriate storage centers accept waste from the 
nuclear cycle, there is some hesitation with respect to 
radioactive waste of what is considered unknown compo-
sition from the high-energy accelerator environment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Radioactive material from a high-energy accelerator 
environment is mainly metallic in nature with the spectrum 
of induced radionuclides well known. The radiation hazard 
from such activated material is predominantly an external 
one. In view of the small radiological hazard posed by 
material of very low specific activity it should be subject to 
recycling rather than to waste disposal. It is regrettable that 
at present no unique internationally accepted system of 
clearance levels exists. 
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